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“Let us, therefore, lay down a certain maxim, that whenever the public good happens to be the 
matter in question, it is not for the advantage of the public to deprive an individual of his 
property, or even to retrench the least part of it by a law, or a political regulation.”1 
Montesquieu, 1748b, XXVI, XV, p.252 
 
 
Abstract 
In 2008, the EU voted to liberalize its system of planting rights which has strictly regulated vine 
plantings in the EU. However, after an intense lobbying campaign the liberalization of the planting 
right system was overturned in 2013 and new regulations could create an even more restrictive 
system. European wine associations have complained about the detrimental effects of the new 
regulations. There is a precedent in history. In 1726, the French political philosopher and 
landowner Montesquieu complained to the French King about the prohibition on planting new 
vines. Montesquieu was not successful in his demands to remove the system of planting rights. 
Old and recent history suggests that political forces against liberalization of planting rights are 
very strong. Only the French Revolution in 1789 led to a fundamental liberalization of planting 
rights. The “liberal period” of the 19th century was sustained by the combination of the French 
Revolution’s liberal ideology, the thirst for wine of Napoleon’s armies and diseases that wiped out 
most of the French vineyards.  
That said, in the past and the present, enforcement of planting rights is a major problem. In fact, 
despite the official restrictions, Montesquieu managed to plant his vines, allowing him to become 
a successful wine producer and merchant and to travel and to spend time thinking, discussing and 
ultimately writing up his ideas which influenced much of the Western world’s constitutions. (JEL 
Classification: K23, L51, N43, N54, Q18) 
Keywords: planting rights, wine, Common Market Organization, European Union, institutions, 
regulation. 
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1 Translation by the authors: “Posons donc pour maxime que, lorsqu’il s’agit du bien public, le bien public n’est jamais 
que l’on prive un particulier de son bien, ou même qu’on lui en retranche la moindre partie par une loi ou un règlement 
politique.” (Montesquieu, 1748b, XXVI, XV, p.252). 
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I. Introduction 
 
On April 15, 2014, a consortium of all major European wine associations2 co-signed an urgent 
letter to all the European Union (EU) governments and the EU Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development complaining about the detrimental effects of new proposed regulations and 
restrictions on planting vineyards: 
 
“We are extremely concerned that the [proposals] would result in an even more restrictive 
regime (…) it would fatally jeopardize the competitiveness of the EU wine sector in a context of 
international competition. It would be just irresponsible to impose (…) arbitrary or 
discriminatory criteria and restrictions (…).”  
“We are shocked by the lack of ambition for our sector shown by our national governments. (…) 
Their requests are not justified on the grounds of protecting the sector against possible 
oversupply (…) their requests are driven by fear, selfishness and corporatist protectionisms.” 
Comité Européen des Entreprises Vins (CEEV), 2014 
 
The letter reflects the frustrations and concerns of the European wine associations. In 2014, 
when the wine associations wrote their letter, things looked very different than a few years earlier. 
In 2008, the European Union (EU) had decided to liberalize the EU’s vineyard planting rights 
regime. The decision was in line with reforms in other agricultural markets – such as grains, 
oilseeds, sugar and dairy – where various regulations which distorted production allocations had 
                                                          
2 The consortium includes the European Committee of Wine Companies (Comité Européen des Entreprises Vins – 
CEEV) and national wine associations in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Greece and Belgium (i.e., Union 
des Maisons & Marques de Vin–UMVIN, Fédération Française des Vins d’Apéritif–FFVA, Federación Española del 
Vino –FEV, Unione Italiana Vini–UIV, Federazione Italiana Industriali Produttori, Esportatori ed Importatori di Vini, 
Acquaviti, Liquori, Sciroppi, Aceti ed affini–FEDERVINI, Bundesverband der Deutschen Weinkellereien und des 
Weinfachhandels–BDWW, Associação dos Comerciantes e Industriais de Bebidas Espirituosas e Vinhos–ACIBEV, 
Associação das Empresas de Vinho do Porto–AEVP, Greek Wine Federation–SEO, Fédération Belge des Vins et 
Spiritueux–FBVS). 
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been removed and replaced by a more market oriented policy combined with direct income support 
for farmers (Swinnen, 2014). 
Also in the wine sector extensive regulations had led to problems of oversupply, low quality 
and distorted market. After a series of more timid reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, the European 
Commission proposed to get rid of the planting rights regime, a system which regulated and 
restricted vineyard planting since 1970, in line with the removal of production quotas in e.g. the 
dairy and sugar sectors. After two years of discussions, in 2008, the EU Ministers of Agriculture 
adopted the EU Commission’s proposal to liberalize the planting rights as part of broader reform 
of the EU wine sector.3  
However, almost as soon as the liberalization decision was reached in 2008, an intense 
lobbying campaign starts to reverse the decision. And successfully so: the liberalization of the 
planting right system was overturned in 2013. Not only was the liberalization decision reversed, a 
series of new proposed regulations could create an even more restrictive system of planting rights 
regulations, depending on how the new regulations will be implemented by the member states. 
Facing the proposal to make vineyard planting even more restrictive, the European wine 
associations wrote their desperate letter to EU governments. 
Recent history shows that the strength of the lobby of those in favor of vine planting 
regulations is more powerful than those opposing them. Moreover, a look at the longer history also 
does not look promising for those opposing planting rights. In fact, there is a precedent to the wine 
associations’ letter. 
                                                          
3 The EU Ministers of Agriculture reached a political agreement in December 2007 on the reform of the EU wine 
market. The decision was formally adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2008. 
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II. An Advocate for the Liberty of Men and Wine 
 
“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. (…) In order to form correct ideas on this important 
subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense, in which the preservation of liberty requires, 
that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct. 
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject, is the celebrated Montesquieu.” 
James Madison, 1788, Federalist, no. 47, 323–31 
 
“Every man invested with power is apt to abuse it (…). To prevent this abuse, it is 
necessary from the very nature of things power should be a check to power.”  
Montesquieu, 1748a, XI, IV, p.2424  
 
In 1748, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755), 
published his famous and most influential work “De l'Esprit des Lois” (The Spirit of the Laws), 
where he argued the need to separate the political power in three separate branches: the executive, 
the legislative and the judicial (Montesquieu, 1748). Montesquieu's work inspired James Madison 
(the “Father of the United States Constitution”) and the American Founders on the separation of 
powers in the 1787 United States Constitution. In fact Montesquieu is the second most cited source 
in the period of Constitution writing – only surpassed by the Bible (Lutz, 1984). Montesquieu’s 
ideas on the separation of powers also inspired the 1791 French Constitution and many other 
constitutions in the world (Lane and Ersson, 2000). 
However, Montesquieu was more than a political philosopher. He was also a wealthy owner 
of land and vineyards in France. In this position he wrote a letter in 1726 to Mr. Le Pelletier, the 
just-appointed French Controlleur Général who was in charge of the finances of King Louis XV 
                                                          
4 Translation by the authors. “(…) tout homme qui a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser (…) Pour qu’on ne puisse abuser 
du pouvoir, il faut que par la disposition des choses le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir.” (Montesquieu, 1748a, XI, IV, 
p.242). 
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(1710–1774) of France. In this essay, like today’s European wine associations, he bitterly 
complained about the newly introduced prohibition on planting new vines:  
 
“The prohibition on planting vines is useless because the owner knows, much better than the 
Minister, if the vines suffer economic losses; he calculates accurately; and, as winemaking 
requires financial anticipation, costs and care, as long as vines do not yield well, he is naturally 
led to uproot and convert his land into a different kind of revenue, less cumbersome.”5  
Montesquieu, 1726, p.267 
 
Montesquieu argued that the 1725 prohibition was “useless” because winegrowers were 
much more competent in assessing the needs of the market than public officers (“il n’y entend 
rien”–“they understand nothing about it”). According to Montesquieu, given the high demand for 
Bordeaux wines (in France and abroad such as in England, Holland and Flanders), it is in the public 
interest to rely on the winegrowers entrepreneurial skills to invest in the most efficient vineyards: 
 
“[The Bordeaux wine region] must provide different kinds of wines to the foreign market, 
depending on the diversity of its soils. However, the taste of foreigners varies continuously (…). 
We must therefore follow this inconsistent taste, planting or uprooting accordingly.”6 
Montesquieu, 1726, p.267 
 
While Montesquieu may have inspired the United States Constitution, he was not able to 
convince the French King (or his advisors) to get rid of planting rights. Actually, he may have 
made things worse when he complained that partial planting rights would only induce other regions 
to plant more. In fact, this was his only argument that was taken up by King Louis XV. In 1731, 
                                                          
5 Translation by the authors. “Elle (la défense) est inutile parce que le propriétaire sait, beaucoup mieux que le 
Ministre, si ses vignes lui sont à charge ou non; il calcule bien exactement; et, comme la manufacture des vignes 
demande beaucoup d’avances, de frais et de soins, pour peu qu’elles ne rendent point, il est porté naturellement à les 
arracher, et à convertir sa terre en une autre nature de revenu, moins incommode.” (Montesquieu, 1726, p. 267). 
6 Translation by the authors. “La Guyenne (…) doit fournir à l'étranger différentes sortes de vins, dépendantes de la 
diversité de ses terroirs. Or, le goût des étrangers varie continuellement (…). Il faut donc suivre ce goût inconstant, 
planter ou arracher en conformité.” (Montesquieu, 1726, p.267). 
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the King extended the prohibition to plant vines to the entire kingdom of France. The outcome was 
the opposite of Montesquieu’s intention. 
Montesquieu would not see the end of the planting rights anymore. He passed away in 
1755. Four years later there was some relaxation in the planting rights system, but it is only in 
1789, 34 years after the death of Montesquieu and 64 years after they were introduced, that planting 
rights are removed and wine production is liberalized. The thing that made it happen was … the 
French Revolution. Only a dramatic political change sufficiently shifted the political equilibrium 
to allow a liberalization of planting rights. 
What does this imply for today? As Montesquieu, the European wine associations want to 
remove the restrictions imposed by the planting rights regime. So the question is: what would make 
liberalization of the EU planting rights system possible? In the rest of this paper we document 
many similarities between Montesquieu’s time and now in terms of the motivation for the 
introduction of the planting rights, their extension to other regions and problems of 
implementation. This comparative analysis suggests that, as planting rights were ultimately 
abolished and plantings liberalized only after a major political change in the 18th century, it may 
require another (type of) French Revolution this time again.  
III. Planting Rights Restrictions in 18th Century France 
 
“In France the anxiety of the proprietors of the old vineyards to prevent the planting of any new 
ones, seems to (…) indicate (…) that this superior profit can last no longer than the laws which 
at present restrain the free cultivation of the vine. In 1731, they obtained an order of council 
prohibiting both the planting of new vineyards and the renewal of those old ones (…).” 
Adam Smith, 1776, p.217 
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As Meloni and Swinnen (2013, 2014) show, many wine regulations are political responses 
to excessive supplies of wine, which are, in turn, often triggered by earlier periods of shortage. 
The regulations in France during Montesquieu’s time are no exception. The domestic oversupply 
of wine in the early 18th century followed earlier shortages caused by the destruction of many 
vineyards through extreme weather conditions and an increase in wine consumption with 
economic growth.  
An exceptionally cold winter in Europe in late 1708 and early 1709, the Great Frost (“Le 
Grand Hiver”), resulted in the destruction of many vineyards and in an increase in wine prices 
(Labrousse, 1933; Le Roy Ladurie, 1960). At the same time, demand was growing due to an 
increase in wine consumption in the rural areas of France. Until the beginning of the 18th century, 
wine consumption was much lower in the rural areas than in the cities, where wine was consumed 
on a daily basis. This changed during the early 18th century as France recovered from the constant 
wars of King Louis XIV of France (between 1661 and 1715). The increased well-being in the rural 
areas led to an increase in wine consumption. As peasants drank more wine, wine prices increased 
(Dion, 1959, p.597). 
The increased demand and higher prices, attracted investments in vineyard plantings. The 
extension of new vineyards was most important in the regions of Touraine, Anjou and Bordeaux. 
Martin (1907, p.19) notes that King Louis XV was informed that: “in the best areas of the 
Bordeaux province, the residents abandoned (…) the cultivation of arable land, to engage in (…) 
the planting of vineyards in the hope of finding a substantial profit in wines that the foreigners are 
in the habit of buying.”7  
                                                          
7 Translation by the authors. “Le Roy étant informé que dans les meilleurs cantons de la généralité de Bordeaux, les 
habitants ont depuis plusieurs années abandonnés la culture des terres labourables, pour se livrer par préférence à 
la plantation des vignes, dans l'espérance de trouver un profit considérable dans les vins que les étrangers sont dans 
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It was also pointed out to King Louis XV that these vineyard plantings occurred “without 
reflecting on the disadvantages that result from too great abundance”.8 French wine production 
increased strongly around 1720 as farmers and landowners started to plant vines instead of grain 
(since winegrowing was more profitable), and because new (younger) vines are more productive 
than older ones.9 Not surprisingly, wine prices declined significantly with production growth. 
With their returns from the market declining, the owners of existing (older) vineyards in 
the renowned and established wine regions turned to the government to support them.10 Many 
belonged to rich and influential families.11 They pressured both the Council of State (Conseil 
d’Etat)12 and the local administration (intendant)13 to intervene (de Tocqueville, 1856; Smith, 
1776; Unwin, 1991). In France, two institutions were in charge of the local administration: the 
“parlements” (regional courts) which were the highest juridical organizations and the “généralités” 
(provinces) which governed the police and the economy of the area. Membership of both 
institutions was limited to clergy and nobles (Brink, 1986). 
                                                          
l'habitude d'enlever (…).” (Extract from the edict of the Council of State on the prohibition to plant vines in Bordeaux 
without permission from the King – February 27, 1725. In: Martin, 1907, p.19). 
8 Translation by the authors. “(…) sans faire réflexion aux inconvénients qui résultent de la trop grande abondance 
(…).” (Extract from the edict of the Council of State on the prohibition to plant vines in Bordeaux without permission 
from the King – February 27, 1725. In: Martin, 1907, p.19). 
9 In the first three years of life, vines do not yield (almost) any wine. Then it takes another three years (on average) 
before vines reach their fixed limit of expansion and their yield stabilize before decreasing again. The consensus is 
that older vines make better wine; and that younger vines are more productive but of lower quality (Robinson, 2006, 
p.740). 
10 This is consistent with political economy mechanisms that influence agricultural protection and price policy (see 
Anderson et al., 2013; Swinnen, 1994). 
11 In 1755, three-quarters of their income was deriving from wine sales (Brut-Moncassin, 2006, p.196) 
12 From the 15th to the 18th century, the Council of State was part of the French’s state administration, in charge of 
advising the King on judicial matters (Brink, 1986). 
13 The key person of the local administration was the intendant who represented the King in each of the provinces (or 
généralités) and reported directly to the Controlleur Général (“Intendant”, 2014). 
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The lobby efforts were successful: between 1722 and 1731, various regulations were 
introduced to reduce the supply of wine (see Table 1). For example, in Guyenne –an historic region 
in southwestern France which corresponds to the present-day Gironde, Lot-et-Garonne, Dordogne, 
Lot, and Aveyron departments and which includes the Bordeaux wine region– the existing owners 
of vineyards were nobles or magistrates.14 They typically owned vineyards on the slopes in the 
traditional Médoc region, situated north of Bordeaux.15 In contrast, the “fury of plantings” 
concerned mostly vineyards in the vast plains south of Bordeaux (Enjalbert, 1953; Johnson, 1989, 
p.256–58). The existing vineyard owners lobbied Mr. Boucher, the intendant of Guyenne, who 
wrote to Mr. Dodun, Controlleur Général in charge of the King’s finances. In his letter, the 
intendant of Guyenne proposed to uproot at least one third of the vines planted since 1709 
(Montesquieu, 1726).16 Successively, Mr. Dodun wrote a report to the King of France, Louis XV 
on the overplanting of vines in the Bordeaux area. 
In 1725, the Council of State forbade planting of new vines in the Guyenne province (the 
Bordeaux wine region) without an “express permission” of the King of France.17 The mentioned 
                                                          
14 A century before, when Olivier de Serres (1600) writes his famous agricultural treatise, he analyzes the vineyards 
of Bordeaux and the involvement of the upper class in winemaking. He concludes that the quality of wine is related 
to the quality of the winegrower: “The esteemed man produces good wine” [Translation by the authors:  “Que celui 
est estimé homme de bien, qui a de bon vin”] (Serres, 1600, p.200).  
15 The most influential and wealthy magistrate was Nicolas-Alexandre, Marquis de Ségur (1697–1755) known as the 
Prince des Vignes (Prince of Vines) who owned various properties near Bordeaux, including the renowned Castles of 
Lafite, Latour and Mouton. The Prince des Vignes managed to lower his taxes by lobbying Mr. de Tourny (the 
intendant of Guyenne) after a bad vintage of 1744 (Johnson, 1989, p.257). 
16 “(…) it was hoped to uproot, at least, one third of those [the vines] who had been planted since 1709” [Translation 
by the authors: “(…) qu’il auroit été à souhaiter qu’on arrachât, au moins, un tiers de celles [les vignes] qui avoient 
été plantées depuis 1709”] (Montesquieu, 1726, p.264). 
17 “The King (…) orders (…) that it shall be no new planting of vines in the province of Bordeaux without express 
permission of His Majesty, under penalty of three thousand livres of fine and more (…).” [Translation by the authors: 
“(…) oui le rapport du sieur Dodun, conseiller ordinaire au conseil royal, controlleur général des finances, le Roy 
(…) ordonne (…) il ne sera fait aucune nouvelle plantation de vignes dans l'étendue de la généralité de Bordeaux 
sans une permission expresse de Sa Majesté, à peine de trois mille livres d'amende et de plus grande (…).”] (Extract 
from the edict of the Council of State on the prohibition to plant vines in Bordeaux without permission from the King 
– February 27, 1725. In: Martin, 1907, p.19). 
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reason for the edict was “to provide for the best interests of the inhabitants of Bordeaux”,18 which 
in reality were the best interests of the existing vineyard owners. Yet, the Council of State did not 
follow the proposed “uprooting” plan and only prohibited new plantings. 
Other provinces, including Champagne (the Châlons province), also issued royal edicts 
forbidding the planting of new vines.19 And some regions did introduce uprootings: the regional 
court of Metz (located in the northeast of France) forbade the planting of new vines and ordered 
the uprooting of all vines planted before 1700 (Denis, 1995; Dion, 1959, p.598). 
IV. Regulations Breed More Regulations 
 
“Moreover, this prohibition is pernicious because either it is general for the whole kingdom, or 
not. (...) This prohibition is pernicious by being too narrow-minded: as the other provinces can 
indiscriminately and freely plant their vines”20 
Montesquieu, 1726, p.267 
 
In his petition against the authorities, Montesquieu not only declared that the 1725 
prohibition to plant vine was “useless” but also that it was “pernicious” and “narrow-minded”, 
unless it would be applied to the entire kingdom. If limited to a certain region (i.e., the Bordeaux 
wine region), the neighboring areas could still freely plant their vines and produce cheaper wines 
                                                          
18 Translation by the authors. “(…) à quoy Sa Majesté désirant pourvoir pour le propre intérêt des habitans de ladite 
généralité de Bordeaux (…).” (Extract from the edict of the Council of State on the prohibition to plant vines in 
Bordeaux without permission from the King – February 27, 1725. In: Martin, 1907, p.19). 
19 “(…) many Council’s edicts were issued to this purpose, by which all new planting of vines have been forbidden 
without express permission of His Majesty, in the généralités of Tours, Bordeaux, Auvergne, Châlons, Montauban 
and in the province of Alsace (…)” [Translation by the authors. “(…) il auroit esté rendu différents arrests du Conseil, 
par lesquels toutes nouvelles plantations de vignes ont esté défendues sans une permission expresse de Sa Majesté, 
dans les généralités de Tours, Bordeaux, Auvergne, Châlons, Montauban et dans la province d'Alsace (…)”] (Extracts 
from the edict of the Council of State extending to the whole kingdom the prohibition to plant vines without permission 
– June 5, 1731. In: Martin, 1907, pp.27–29). 
20 Translation by the authors. “D'ailleurs, cette défense est pernicieuse: car, ou elle est générale pour tout le royaume, 
ou non. (…) cette défense est pernicieuse en ce qu’elle est trop bornée: car, les autres provinces étant dans la liberté 
de planter, elles le font indifféremment.” (Montesquieu, 1726, p.267). 
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at prices that could undermine the reputation (and prices) of Bordeaux wines. Hence local planting 
rights have negative effects: “if the same precautions are not taken in neighboring provinces, the 
remedy would be a very poor one”.21 
Montesquieu made these arguments because he was against state intervention.22 His 
assessment on the effects of the prohibition on planting vines turned out to be visionary – but not 
his anticipation of the policy response. 
As Montesquieu had predicted, these restrictions were “pernicious” in that they just 
resulted in substitution of wine from other regions. The neighboring areas of Bordeaux (as Quercy, 
Languedoc, Saintonge, Aunis and Poitou) planted more vineyards and flooded the Guyenne region 
(Martin, 1907).  
However, instead of following Montesquieu’s proposal to liberalize, King Louis XV 
decided to do the opposite. Once again, the existing vineyard owners lobbied the French 
administration. And again they were influential. In 1731, following three years of good grape 
harvests, his “remède” (“remedy”) was to extend the prohibition to plant new vines to the entire 
French kingdom. The 1731 edict stated that:  
 
“there shall be no new planting of vines in the provinces of the kingdom, and that those 
who have been two years without being cultivated cannot be replanted without express 
permission of His Majesty”.23 
                                                          
21 Translation by the authors. “(…) si l'on ne prenoit pas les mesmes précautions dans les généralitez et provinces 
voisines, le remède ne procureroit qu'un bien médiocre (…).” (Extracts from the edict of the Council of State extending 
to the whole kingdom the prohibition to plant vines without permission – June 5, 1731. In: Martin, 1907, pp.27–29). 
22 In the French edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes 
provocatively described Montesquieu as “the real French equivalent of Adam Smith. The greatest of your economists, 
head and shoulders above the physiocrats in penetration, clear-headedness and good sense (which are the qualities 
an economist should have).” (Devletoglou, 1963). 
23 “His Majesty wanted to stop the new planting of vines and overcome the disadvantages that result from it (…) there 
shall be no new planting of vines in the provinces of the kingdom, and that those who have been two years without 
being cultivated cannot be replanted without express permission of His Majesty, under penalty of three thousand livres 
fine (…).” [Translation by the authors: “Sa Majesté voulant faire cesser ces nouvelles plantations de vignes et remédier 
aux inconvénients qui en résultent (…) il ne sera fait aucune nouvelle plantation de vignes dans l'estendue des 
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The edict clearly indicated that the measure was driven by the interests of the existing 
vineyard owners producing “high quality” wines: “over-abundance of vines in the kingdom that 
occupies a large amount of land suitable to grow grain or pastures (…) multiplied the quantity of 
wine to the extent that the value and reputation in many places was destroyed”.24  
In summary, Montesquieu’s only argument that was taken up by the French King was that 
local planting rights are inefficient. However, instead of liberalization, the outcome was more 
regulations as planting rights were introduced throughout the French kingdom and restrictions 
were extended to the old vines (and not only on the new vines). Vines abandoned for more than 
two years could not be replanted without an express authorization from the King.  
V. Planting Rights Liberalization after 1789 
 
“(…) the Revolutionaries appeared ready to sweep through grandiose measures which would not 
only liberate men, but also the landed property of France.” 
Plack, 2009, p.35 
 
While there were significant problems with their enforcement (see further), the planting 
rights introduced by King Louis XV lasted for almost 70 years. They were abolished only in 1789, 
as part of a major political, institutional and economic transition: the French Revolution. The 
French Revolution started with the assault on the Bastille on 14 July 1789. It promoted liberty of 
                                                          
provinces et généralités du royaume, et que celles qui auront eslé deux ans sans estre cultivées, ne pourront estre 
restablies sans une permission expresse de Sa Majesté, à peine de trois mille livres d'amende (…).”(Extracts from the 
edict of the Council of State extending to the whole kingdom the prohibition to plant vines without permission – June 
5, 1731. In: Martin, 1907, pp.27–29). 
24 Translation by the authors. “Sur les représentations qui avoient esté faites au Roy depuis longtemps, que la trop 
grande abondance des plants de vignes dans le royaume occupoit une grande quantité de terres propres à porter des 
grains ou à former des pâturages (…) et multiplioit tellement la quantité des vins qu'ils en détruisoient la valeur et la 
réputation dans beaucoup d'endroits.” (Extracts from the edict of the Council of State extending to the whole kingdom 
the prohibition to plant vines without permission – June 5, 1731. In: Martin, 1907, pp.27–29). 
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Men (Liberté) and destroyed all previous privileges. Three weeks after the assault on the Bastille, 
a series of decrees abolished feudalism, serfdom, seigneurial and royal privileges in place during 
the previous “Ancien Régime”. However, it would take “over one hundred decrees and four more 
years until the seigneurial regime was completely dismantled” (Plack, 2009). 
 The liberty principle of the French Revolution also implied vines could be planted 
anywhere in France. It not only removed the planting rights, it also proved to be a turning point in 
the political equilibrium on planting rights for the next century and a half. There was considerable 
lobbying by vineyard owners in the rich wine regions in the 19th century but it was not successful 
in reintroducing the planting rights regime. They (unsuccessfully) pressured the French 
government during Consulate (1799–1804), the First Empire (1804–1814) and the Restoration 
(1814–1830) (Dion, 1959, p.600).25  
The French governments in the 19th century refused to introduce planting rights because 
they were inspired by the principles of the French revolution, favoring the rights of new 
winegrowers and of the masses to access cheap wines. However, they also feared popular 
discontent if they would reduce the supply of wine, since the French wine market in the 19th 
century was mostly characterized by high demand. In the first decades of the 19th century, the 
demand for wine was very high in France due to the Napoleonic wars that lasted from 1803 to 
1815.26 The wars required a continuous supply of food and drink for an army of many hundreds 
                                                          
25 Already in 1800, a report from the Commission on Agriculture stated that in 30 years vines had multiplied by five, 
taking over arable land suitable for the cultivation of grain – a “radical vice”. In 1808, the Empire's representative 
(préfet) of the Aube (Champagne region) was wishing that “vines were uprooted from the plains”. Again, in 1813, the 
préfet of the Moselle claimed that “a wise foresight had dictated the measure [planting restrictions]. It would be 
desirable that it was renewed” (Dion, 1959, p.602). 
26 In this twelve years’ war period, Napoleon won 53 battles and lost 7 – with the 1815 Battle of Waterloo as one of 
the biggest  and final defeat (Roberts, 2014). 
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of thousands of soldiers.27 Demand for wine was high since wine was still a safer drink compared 
to water and it was used to “fuel” the soldiers in the battles. Many witness accounts describe drunk 
soldiers’ actions in the battles. During the French invasion of Spain in 1808, a senior commissary 
officer observed that: “In the end Villafranca was literally plundered, and the drunkenness that 
prevailed ... led to the most shameful incidents” (Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 2004, p.206). 
Later in the 19th century two major vine diseases reduced the supply of wine (and thus any 
demand for planting restrictions). About 30 years after the end of the Napoleonic wars, the 
outbreak of two vine diseases ravaged France’s vineyards. The first wave of vine fungal disease 
in France (oidium or powdery mildew) showed up in 1846. In seven years, from 1847 to 1854, 
wine production collapsed from 54 million to 11 million hectoliters, an 80% decline. However, 
the discovery of sulfur to tackle the vine disease allowed a rapid recovery. French wine production 
was back at 54 million hectoliters in 1858 (Insee, 1935; Paul, 1996, p.12).  
Six years later, another vine disease, Phylloxera, appeared. It also had dramatic 
consequences and destroyed many vineyards in France.28 One-third of the French vine area was 
destroyed, and the remaining (infected) vineyards produced little wine. French wine production 
declined by about 70% in the 1870s and 1880s (Augé-Laribé, 1950; Lachiver, 1988).  
In summary, in the 19th century planting rights did not return to France due to a combination 
of the dominant liberal philosophy of the French Revolution and the limited pressure to restrict 
supplies during several periods of excess demand caused by the high demand for wine to satisfy 
                                                          
27 Napoleon’s army was called “La Grande Armée” (The Great Army) and reached a total of about 680,000 soldiers 
by 1812 (Houdecek, 2012). 
28 Phylloxera, a parasite that lives on the vines’ root systems and eventually kills the plant, originated in North America 
and arrived in Europe in 1863 (Augé-Laribé, 1950; Lachiver, 1988). 
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Napoleon’s armies thirst in the first half of the century and two major diseases that crippled French 
wine production in much of the second half.  
However, as in the early 18th century, the shortage of wine due to the devastation of the 
vineyards in the late 19th century forebode a future surplus problem – and pressure to reduce 
supply. 
VI. L’Histoire se répète.29 Planting Rights Regimes in the 20th Century  
 
“This is a law of a very exceptional nature ... We believe it is, since the French 
Revolution, the legislation with the largest government intervention in the economy.  
This is... a planned economy.”30 
Mr. Jean-Ch. Leroy, General Counsel of the Wine Appellations of Origin, 1932 
 
The ‘liberal’ wine regime (without planting rights) would last 150 years. Planting 
restrictions were (re-)introduced in 1931 in France (exactly 200 years after King Louis XV’s 1731 
planting prohibitions) and after France’s integration in the European Economic Community 
(EEC), the precursor of the European Union (EU), planting rights would spread across Europe in 
the second half of the 20th century (see Table 1). 
The outbreak of Phylloxera and the collapse of French wine production in the late 19th 
century induced major investments in vineyards in Algeria, a colony of France. The crisis induced 
an inflow of skills in wine-making through the migration of many broke French winegrowers to 
Algeria, and it caused an increase in the demand for Algerian wine. Algerian wine exports to 
France increased rapidly (Meloni and Swinnen, 2014). 
                                                          
29 History Repeats Itself. 
30 Translation by the authors. “Il s’agit ici d’une loi d’un caractère très exceptionnel. On peut dire, croyons-nous, 
qu’elle constitue, depuis la Révolution française, la mesure législative la plus importante consacrant l’intervention 
de l’état dans le domaine de la vie économique. C’est, suivant l’expression à la mode, de l’économie dirigée au 
premier chef” (In: Société de législation comparée, 1932, p.96). 
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By the beginning of the 20th century, French vineyards had gradually been reconstructed 
thanks to the planting of hybrid grape varieties and the use of grafting, and production recovered. 
The combination of many new high productive vineyards and growing imports from Algeria 
caused a major surplus crisis on the French wine market. With the growing surplus, the pressure 
on the French government to intervene grew. This time pressure came from winegrowers located 
in the Midi region in southern France, organized in the Confédération Générale des Vignerons du 
Midi (General Confederation of Midi Winemakers–CGVM). The destructions of World War I 
temporarily reduced wine supplies. However as production recovered and wine prices declined in 
the 1920s, the pressure on the government to intervene grew. When protests turned into violence, 
the French government gave in and introduced a series of laws aimed at restricting the wine supply 
(Meloni and Swinnen, 2013). 
In 1931, vine planting restrictions were (re-)introduced in France, again to protect existing 
vineyard owners from increased production by new and cheaper wine producers. The planting 
rights were part of the Statut Viticole,31 the new French wine policy regime introduced to protect 
established French producers from increased production in Algeria and other regions of France 
(JORF, 1931, Article 3). In 1935, another law restricted production of certain wines to specific 
regions (through areas’ delimitation) and to specific production criteria such as grape variety, 
minimum alcohol content, and maximum vineyard yields –as part of the creation of Appellations 
d’Origine Contrôlées (AOC) (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013, 2014). 
World War II caused a temporary break in the restrictions. French production declined 
from 60 million hectoliters in 1938 to 29 million hectoliters in 1945 due to massive vineyard 
destruction. As a result, the Statut Viticole was suspended in 1942. After the war, wine demand 
                                                          
31 Laws were issued in 1931, 1933, 1934, and 1935 (JORF, 1931, 1933, 1934, 1935). 
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grew rapidly and supply was still low. This resulted in high prices, which encouraged vineyard 
replantings. Wine prices in 1946 were approximately three times those in 1939 (INAO, 1943, p.35; 
Insee, 1966, p.190).  
As in the 18th century and earlier in the 20th century, wine production increased strongly in 
the following years, because young vines were more productive than older ones, and because of 
increased wine imports from Algeria. The increase in wine production reduced prices again and 
soon resulted in new pressure for political intervention. In 1947, the French government decided 
that winegrowers could only plant new vines if they had grubbed up the equivalent surface area. 
However, the 1947 regulation was hardly enforced and winegrowers continued to plant “illegal” 
vines (Warner, 1960, p.174). 
In 1953, a new planting rights regime was introduced in France. The new wine policy (the 
Statut Viticole) was reintroduced under the name Code du Vin. The law reestablished planting 
restrictions and “replanting rights”, subsidies to uproot vines, as well as surplus storage,32 
compulsory distillation,33 and penalties for high yields (JORF, 1953; Milhau, 1953).  
The restrictions in the Code du Vin were linked to production regions – based on the French 
“terroir” principal which through regulations links “quality” with location and which today is 
present in many Geographical Indications (GIs) – and grape varieties. First, the 1953 Code 
identified which regions were qualified for viticulture. All “other regions” were not qualified for 
viticulture according to the government. If there were vineyards there, then they were “regions of 
reconversion” and the vineyards needed to be uprooted (JORF, 1953).  
                                                          
32 In years of overproduction, aid for private storage for their wine surplus was given to winegrowers. 
33 Wine distillation is the process by which wine is transformed either into raw alcohol and spirits or into industrial 
alcohol.   
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Second, inside the regions officially qualified for viticulture, the restrictions were different 
for table wines (“low quality” wines) and AOC wines (“high quality” wines) (see Figure 1).34 AOC 
wines were (by AOC-definition) only produced in specific (sub-)regions (such as Bordeaux or 
Champagne) and new plantings were allowed under the specific AOC regulations.35 For table 
wines the general principle was that no new plantings were allowed. 
Third, there were further distinctions within the table wines with more restrictions. New 
(additional) plantings were prohibited for all table wines but replanting, after vineyards had been 
uprooted, was allowed under strict conditions. The lowest category of grape varieties was the 
“prohibited” (mainly hybrids, as Noah, Othello, Isabelle, Jacquez, Clinton and Herbemont) who 
needed to be grubbed up and its wine distilled. The second category was the “temporarily 
tolerated” who could not be replanted. The third category was the “authorized” varieties. If these 
varieties were used, the producer had to reduce the area with 30% when replanting. The fourth 
category was the “recommended” grape varieties. If producers planted these grapes, they could go 
for the same (100%) area as they had grubbed up. Finally, it should be noted that these “replanting 
rights” could not be transferred to other producers or landowners (JORF, 1953, Article 30).   
The impact of the introduction of planting restrictions and subsidies to uproot vines was 
sizable. From 1953 to 1957, around 120,000 hectares of vines were uprooted, representing 7% of 
the total vineyard area. As a consequence, French wine production declined by about 10% in the 
same period (Insee, 1966, p.190). Moreover, due to the policy of replanting of vines to “better vine 
                                                          
34 In 1953, 87% of wine in France was produced as table wine and only 13% as AOC wine (Humbert, 2011). 
35 The AOC wines restricted production not only to specific regional origins (through delimitation of specific areas) 
but also to specific production criteria such as grape variety, minimum alcohol content, and maximum vineyard yields. 
AOC wines could only be produced with specific grape varieties listed in the so-called cahier des charges (“book of 
specifications”). For instance, for the AOC Champagne, only 7 grape varieties can be planted within the delimitation: 
Chardonnay, Pinot Noir, Pinot Meunier, Pinot Blanc, Pinot Gris, Arbane and Petit Meslier. 
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varieties”, in the next 10 years (1958–1968), the share of the “recommended” grape varieties 
increased from 58% to 90% of the planted grape varieties in France (Durbiano, 1975). 
 
Regulations breed more regulations – again  
Economic integration in the European Economic Community (EEC) during the 1960s and 
1970s required the integration of different policy regimes in one EEC wine policy (the Common 
Market Organization (CMO) for wine). The most important producers, Italy and France, held 
different positions (see Table 2). While France’s wine market was highly regulated through 
government intervention, including prohibitions on new vineyards and price supports, Italy had 
more liberal wine policies: there were no price interventions or planting restrictions.  
The Treaty of Rome (1957) fixed a “transitional period” for a common policy to be 
negotiated and introduced. The initial EEC regulatory steps toward a Common Wine Policy was 
taken in 1962. It was far from a common policy and only required that each member state 
established a viticultural land register; the notification of annual production levels to a central 
authority (harvest and stock declarations); the annual compilation of future estimates of resources 
and requirements; and stricter rules on “quality wines”.36 There was no agreement on stronger 
regulations such as planting rights (Council Regulation No. 24/1962). The transition period was 
supposed to end in 1969 and, by 1969, wine was the last major agricultural product that was still 
subject to national regulations. Italy and France had to reach an agreement on a common policy 
by the end of the year (Niederbacher, 1983; Spahni, 1988).37 
                                                          
36 EU “quality regulations” are based on the “appellation” system and include policy instruments such as the 
geographical delimitation of a certain wine area, winegrowing and production rules, and rules on labeling (Meloni and 
Swinnen, 2013). 
37 Also in other agricultural commodities, such as grains, dairy, and oilseeds, there was a transition period of 
approximately ten years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome (in 1957) before a common market organization was 
fully implemented. 
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In the absence of common EEC regulations, national wine policies continued. In 1964 there 
was some relaxation of planting rights restrictions in France. The main reason was the fall in 
Algerian wine imports. After Algeria achieved independence in 1962, France imposed import 
restrictions and tariffs on Algerian wine causing a dramatic decline in imports of Algerian wine 
and therefore in the total wine supply in France. A second factor was a decrease in Italian wine 
production due to a decrease of mixed crop vineyards and to the Italian miracolo economico 
(economic miracle) that led to massive exodus from the rural areas into the cities (Bartoli et al., 
1987, p.23; Meloni and Swinnen, 2014; Niederbacher, 1983). 
In 1964 two laws, on “the wine production and organization of the wine market” and on 
“the organization of the vineyard and improving the quality of wine production”, eased rules on 
market intervention and especially on planting rights (JORF, 1964a and 1964b).38 First, the 1964 
law allowed the transfer of wine “replanting rights” from one winegrower to another. Second, the 
planting of new vines was extended to table wines (and not only to AOC wines) and was allowed 
if justified by “favorable economic prospects and trade opportunities” or by “improving the 
geographical distribution of the vineyard or the structure of farms” (JORF 1964a).39  
                                                          
38 The relaxation of the 1953 legislation allowed, for instance, producers were given more freedom to plant and irrigate 
their vineyards. 
39 “Within the limit of a maximum amount of areas planted with new vines (...), authorizations for planting new vines 
may be granted for the production of table wines (...) the granting of these authorizations may however take place 
only if is justified by economic prospects, especially by those of foreign trade and future opportunities, or by improving 
the geographical distribution of the vineyard or by improving the structure of farms.” [Translation by the authors. 
“Dans la limite d'un montant maximum de superficies plantées en vignes nouvelles (…), des autorisations nouvelles 
de plantations de vignes pourront être octroyées en vue de la production de vins de consommation courante et de 
raisins de table (…) l'octroi de ces autorisations ne peut toutefois avoir lieu que s'il est justifié par les perspectives 
économiques, et notamment par celles du commerce extérieur et des débouchés futurs, et s'il doit aboutir à une 
amélioration tant de la répartition géographique du vignoble sur le territoire que de la structure des exploitations 
agricoles.”] (JORF 1964a, Article 3). 
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However, restrictions were not fully removed. For example, replanting with authorized 
varieties was still restricted at 70%,40 the transfer of wine “replanting rights” was subject to 
authorization by the Institut des Vins de Consommation Courante (IVCC)41 and new planting of 
table wines was allowed only if the “recommended” grape varieties were used within the regions 
qualified for viticulture (JORF 1964a, Articles 1 and 3).42 
During the 1964–1970 period, this “more liberal” French planting regime helped to 
facilitate the negotiations between France and Italy. In 1970, a compromise between the positions 
of Italy and France formed the basis of the European Common Wine Policy (CWP).43 The 1970 
CWP introduced restrictions on vine plantings for the entire EEC. The structure of the EEC 
planting rights regime strongly resembled the French system, but in a weaker version of 
implementation. First, as in the French system a distinction was made between “table wines” and 
“quality wines produced in a specific region” (often abbreviated to “quality wines psr” or simply 
“quality wines”, as AOC in France or Denominazione di Origine Controllata (DOC) in Italy). 
Second, within the table wine regime different grape categories were introduced. Vines were 
classified as “recommended,” “authorized,” and “provisionally authorized” varieties – with 
                                                          
40 This restriction is still in place in the latest French Rural Code: “If, when planting, authorized varieties are used, 
replanting rights are reduced by 30%” [Translation by the authors. “Si, lors de la plantation, des variétés classées 
autorisées sont employées, les droits de replantation subissent un abattement de 30%”.] (Code Rural 2008, Article 
R665-16). 
41 The Institut des Vins de Consommation Courante (Institute of the Wines of Current Consumption–IVCC), a 
government branch, was established in 1953 to administer table wines and to classify grape varieties (Loubère, 1990, 
p.132).  
42 “In addition, new planting rights for wine production are granted only if recommended varieties are used and in 
the regions qualified for viticulture” [Translation by the authors. “En outre, les droits de plantation nouvelle de vigne 
destinée à la production du vin ne sont accordés que s'il s'agit de cépages recommandés et dans les terroirs viticoles”.] 
(JORF 1964a, Article 3). 
43 See Meloni and Swinnen (2013) for a discussion of the other CWP regulations.  
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“recommended” as the highest quality level, resembling the French 1953 classification (Council 
Regulation No. 1388/70, Article 6).44 
Restrictions were introduced on the new planting and replanting of vines to “better vine 
varieties” – the so-called “rules designed to improve vine-stock selection”. Also in this aspect the 
CWP structure resembled the French system but under Italian pressure the implementation was 
weakened. In the EEC, new plantings in “quality wines” (e.g., AOC and DOC) regions was 
allowed for both “recommended” and “authorized” grape varieties. Similarly, “authorized” 
varieties were also allowed for new plantings of table wines under EEC rules. However, France 
applied more restrictive national regulations (as allowed under EEC rules) and still imposed only 
“recommended” grape varieties for AOC regions and the “70% replanting rule” for table wines 
(Council Regulation Nos. 816/70 and 817/70; JORF, 1972).45  
However, the compromise on the planting rights regime did not last very long. There was 
continued pressure from France for a more interventionist approach and this pressure grew stronger 
with increasing imports of Italian wine. A full-blown “wine war” exploded in 1974, when 
increasing grape harvests in 1973 and 1974 and a devaluation of the Italian lira lowered prices of 
exported Italian wines. In 1975, French growers physically blocked Italian wine imports at the 
French ports. In 1976, under growing pressure from French producers, who feared that cheaper 
Italian wine would swamp the French market and cause a collapse in prices, the European Council 
                                                          
44 The EEC system of notification was similar to the French “authorization” system. Winegrowers wishing to 
plant/replant vines had to notify the relevant authority. Member states had to document these notifications by “issuing 
a licence prior to the planting or replanting”. The implementation of this was left to member states (Council 
Regulation No. 816/70, Article 17). 
45 As in France, there was a ban on the “provisionally authorized” varieties. The wine made from vines not included 
in the classification was eliminated from the market and distilled (Council Regulation No. 816/70, Articles 15 and 
16). 
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of Ministers introduced stricter measures to control the supply of wine through more stringent 
planting rights restrictions and other policies such as subsidized grubbing-up (i.e., uprooting).46  
The 1976 regulation on vineyard plantings, contrary to the 1970 regulation, not only 
restricted the replanting of vines to “better vine varieties”–  but imposed a total ban on all new 
plantings for table wines.47 Furthermore, member states had to uproot hybrid grape varieties by 
1979 and to uproot “provisionally authorized” grape varieties by 1983 (Council Regulation No. 
1160/76). 
The tighter regulations of planting rights were initially perceived as a temporary measure 
and only affecting “low quality” wines. In fact, the 1976 regulation stated that “All new planting 
of vine varieties (…) shall be prohibited during the period from 1 December 1976 to 30 November 
1978” (Council Regulation No. 1162/76, Article 2). However, since then the system has been 
continuously re-confirmed and it has been continued over the years (becoming a permanent one) 
and even expanded to include also “high quality” wines in 1984 (Council Regulation No. 1208/84).  
Hence, by the mid-1970s, instead of being liberalized, the French wine policy with its 
extensive regulations and heavy government intervention in markets had become the official 
European wine policy. As during the reign of King Louis XV, instead of loosening regulation to 
solve problems of market distortions, the opposite happened: politicians introduced more 
restrictions and extended them to other regions to control supply there as well. 
                                                          
46 The EU provides grubbing-up premiums to winegrowers who permanently (and voluntarily) abandon existing 
vineyards. Under this scheme, wine-growers can decide, on a voluntary basis, to eliminate “all vine stocks on a parcel 
planted with vines” and replace them with other agricultural crops and apply for funding for abandoning their 
vineyards (the grubbing-up premium) (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013). 
47 “Member states shall no longer grant authorizations for new plantings” with three exemptions to the general ban. 
The three exceptions were: (a) new planting intended for the production of quality wines psr in Member States whose 
production of quality wines psr was less than 50 % of the total wine production; (b) new planting carried out under 
development plans; (c) new planting carried out in Member States which produce less than 5 000 hi of wine annually 
using grapes harvested on their territory (Council Regulation No. 1162/76, Article 2). 
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VII. Enforcement Problems 
 
“As France was divided into an infinity of small lordships, which recognized feudal dependency 
rather than political dependency, it would have been very difficult for a single law to have 
authority: indeed, one could not have seen to its enforcement.”48 
Montesquieu, 1748b, XXVIII, IX, p.297 
 
An important problem with the implementation of planting rights restrictions (and with 
quantitative restrictions on output and input use in general49) is the enforcement of the regulations. 
Major problems of enforcement of the EU planting rights system received a lot of publicity in 2012 
when the European Commission fined Greece, Italy and Spain for a total of 250 million euros 
because of 120,000 hectares illegally planted vineyards, around 8% of total vineyard area. For 
instance, in Italy more than 24,000 hectares (equal to about 34,000 soccer fields) of illegal vine 
planting were found (73% of them were found in the Puglia region, in southern Italy) (Corsentino, 
2012).  
Given that technologies have improved so much over the past two centuries it is not 
surprising that enforcement was even more problematic in the 18th century. Martin (1907) argues 
that the 1731 edict did not restrict plantings effectively, and that they were more planted vines in 
the 1750s than in 1731.50  
The edict was weakly enforced for two main reasons. The first reason was the “freedom of 
interpretation” of the intendants in charge of controlling and enforcing the restrictions on the vine 
                                                          
48 Translation by the authors.“D’ailleurs, la France se trouvant divisée en une infinité de petites Seigneuries, qui 
reconnaissoient plutôt une dépendance féodale qu’une dépendance politique, il étoit bien difficile qu’une seule Loi 
pût être autorisée.” (Montesquieu, 1748b, XXVIII, IX, p.297). 
49 Problems of enforcement is an important reason why production quota have been implemented in the EU dairy and 
sugar sector but not in e.g. grains and oilseeds (Swinnen, 2014). 
50 In 1756, Mr. de Tourny (the intendant of Guyenne) wrote a letter to Mr Moras (the Controller General) where he 
stated that they were more planted vines than in 1731 and where he confirmed the need of maintaining the planting 
rights system (Martin, 1907, p.136). 
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planting. Initially, the municipalities inspected whether new vines were planted. This changed 
during the 1740s. Independent persons were appointed. They were in charge of preparing reports 
on the existence of new planting of vines. Based on these reports, the intendant issued the 
sentences. If new vines were found, the vineyard owners were sued in court and legally punished 
with fines of three thousand livres.51 However, in 1737, the 1731 edict was adjusted so that vines 
could be planted if the winegrower was able to prove that the land was not suitable to grow grain.52 
In practice this implied that the edict could (and did) have different effects depending on whether 
the intendant in charge of enforcing the edict was willing (or not) to accept the arguments of the 
winegrower. Dion (1959, p.599) argues that this led to a gradual erosion of the 1731 edict. 
Another reason was the different interests of wine producers in regions such as Bordeaux 
and those located in the Midi region in southern France. After the end of the wars with France that 
lasted from 1689 to 1713, Britain decided to impose high tariffs on French wines in 1714.53 
Volume tariffs on wine (and not ad valorem) hurt especially the export of cheap wines to Britain. 
It allowed the upper British class to continue to consume “high quality” wines while the lower 
class moved to beer (Nye, 2007). Therefore, the British tariffs encouraged landowners in Bordeaux 
to produce “higher quality” (price) wines to continue to export them to England. The landowners 
                                                          
51 For instance, in 1748, Mr. de Tourny (the intendant of Guyenne) enforced 13 fines of three thousand livres based 
on the reports of Mr. Duval (Martin, 1907, p.88).  
52 There are interesting parallels with the policy debates on the use of land for food and alcohol production at different 
times in history. In the current EU debate on biofuels, some object to the use of agricultural land for biofuels (including 
ethanol) or renewable energy (RE) production in order to use the land for food production – and keep food prices low. 
This is an interesting U-turn in the policy debate since before the food price spike of the late 2000s, biofuel and non-
food use of agricultural products were seen as a way of raising agricultural prices and thus EU farm incomes (Swinnen, 
2011). This debate on the competition between food and alcohol for the use of land also has more ancient roots. In 
ancient Rome, Emperor Domitian promulgated an edict in the year 92 AD that imposed the destruction of half of the 
existing vineyards in the Roman provinces and forbade the planting of any new vines in the Italic peninsula in order 
to stimulate grain production needed to supply Rome and its legions (Meloni and Swinnen, 2015).  
53 For an extensive analysis on the political economy of Anglo-French trade, 1689-1900, see the work of John Nye 
(2007). 
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were supervising the entire wine making process and planting lower yielding grapes on the slopes. 
On the contrary, in the Midi, the landowners were not exporting their wines nor aiming at 
increasing their quality. They just wanted more wine to increase their profits and therefore wanted 
to plant higher yielding and more grapes (Dion, 1959, p.598; Enjalbert, 1953; Lacouture, 2003, 
p.134).  
Problems of implementation continue today. In their study of the current EU planting 
rights, Montaigne et al. (2012) point out that “the lack of efficient controls and the non-compliance 
by winemakers” as a major problem. Without appropriate enforcement, the aim of a planting rights 
regime (i.e., restricting supply) is undermined.  
The enforcement of the regulation is, in the first place, the responsibility of the member 
states. They have to manage “appropriate control systems”, i.e. a vineyard register, a planting 
rights register and the associated controls. If the member states discover “unlawful” or “illegal” 
plantings (i.e., areas planted with vines without a corresponding planting right), they must order 
the uprooting of these plantings and punish the winegrowers with fines of 12,000 euro per hectare 
per year until the grubbing-up is done (European Commission, 2012). 
An additional control is made by the European Commission who can fine growers for 
illegal vine planting. The last control was made after the 2008 CMO reform, where winegrowers 
could “regularize” the illegal plantings planted before 1998 against the payment of a fee. However, 
as the 2012 fines illustrates, many illegal plantings remain. 
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VIII. Attempts to Reform the EU Planting Rights 
 
“It took three years of hard work with ups and downs, but in the end the sector scored the 
winning goal (…): the Europeans gods heard our prayers or so to say.” 
European Federation of Origin Wines’s blog54 
 
There have been several proposals to reform the EU wine policy and the planting rights 
system. The most serious attempt –which initially appeared successful– occurred in the second 
half of the 2000s.  
Liberalization of the EU current system of planting rights was widely discussed since 2006, 
when the European Commission proposed a set of bold reforms, which included the elimination 
of planting rights. The European Commission proposed that planting rights restrictions should be 
removed by 2013, allowing producers to freely decide where to plant. The reform proposals were 
in line with the abolition of production quota in the dairy and sugar sectors and reforms in other 
agricultural sectors which had been decided earlier. 
In 2008, the EU leaders approved this major reform of the Common Wine Policy.55 A key 
component was the abolition of the planting rights system. However, the Council of Ministers 
decided to allow a long transition period: the member states wishing to continue the restrictions 
could do so until 2018.  
                                                          
54 EFOW, the European Federation of Origin Wines, was established in 2009 to lobby against the liberalization of 
planting rights. EFOW includes the French Organization of Appellation of Origin Wine Producers (CNAOC), the 
Italian Association of Geographical Indication Wine Consorzi (FEDERDOC), the Spanish Conferencia Española de 
Consejos Reguladores Vitivinícolas (CECRV), the Portuguese Port and Douro Wines Institute (IVDP) and the 
Hungarian Hegyközségek Nemzeti Tanácsa (HNT). In 2010, EFOW created a blog to debate the end of planting rights 
scheduled for 2016. 
55 See Meloni and Swinnen (2013) for more details on the 2008 CMO reform. 
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Although the reform was approved by a qualified majority56 –significantly more than a 
simple majority of votes– in the Council of Ministers, interest groups opposed to the liberalization 
immediately started to re-organize and launched a new lobby campaign. They succeeded in 
changing many member states’ position. The first countries to express their wish to overturn the 
decision were Germany and France in 2010. Since then, all EU member states that produce wine 
joined in asking for a continuation of planting rights (Deconinck and Swinnen, 2015; EFOW, 
2012). This led to a creation of a High Level Group (HLG) on Wine Planting Rights57 and a joint 
decision by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in 2013 to extend the planting 
rights system until 2030 with a new program of authorizations for new plantings starting in 2016 
– effectively overturning the 2008 decision to liberalize (Gaeta and Corsinovi, 2014).58  
There is discussion on whether the new planting rights system is even more restrictive than 
the existing one. In principle, the new “authorization” system could be either more or less 
restrictive, depending on how the new regulations will be implemented by the member states.  
Interestingly, these implementation decisions may change yearly, making an ex-ante assessment 
difficult. 
The new EU-wide “authorization” system will be (once more) based on the French 
authorization system.59 One major difference between the “planting rights” system (as it was 
                                                          
56 Most decisions in the Council of the European Union (often referred to as the Council of Ministers) are taken by 
qualified majority – a system of weighted votes. The number of votes given to each member state is weighted 
according to its size and population. For instance, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 29 votes each 
and Malta has 3. The total number of votes is currently 352 and to adopt a proposal 260 votes are required (e.g. the 
qualified majority) instead of a simple majority of votes (Council of the European Union, 2014).  
57 The HLG was created to make recommendations on the future EU regulation on vine plantings by the end of 2012. 
58 There is an interesting question to what extent the institutional reform which introduced “co-decision” on the wine 
policy (as on other Common Agricultural Policy issues) was a crucial factor in the reversal of the decision. Co-decision 
implies that the European Parliament has to approve the decision together with the Council. For discussions on the 
impact of co-decision, see Crombez et al. (2012) and Knops and Swinnen (2014). 
59 In France, in addition to the “planting rights”, winegrowers also need an “authorization” to plant vines. 
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implemented in many other EU countries) and the “authorization” system (as applied in France) 
is the tradability of the rights. In many EU countries, the “planting rights” can now be traded 
whereas the “authorizations” will be individual and non-transferable. Another major difference is 
that the ability to plant new vines is now extended to wines without a GI (thus not only to PDO/PGI 
wines).60 In addition, these authorizations for new plantings have an annual maximum percentage 
of growth (corresponding to 1% of the member states total area planted with vines). For instance, 
in France it corresponds to 8,057 hectares per year (see Table 3; Regulation No. 1308/2013).61  
 In 2014, fourteen EU wine producing countries requested for new implementation criteria, 
such as the possibility to increase the restrictions for replanting on grape varieties or on the 
“immediate geographical neighbourhood areas to existing vineyards” (CEEV, 2014).62  
These developments triggered the open letter of the European wine associations fearing 
that the recently agreed vine planting authorizations system could result in “an even more 
restrictive regime” than the former planting rights scheme (CEEV, 2014). In their open letter, the 
CEEV claimed that these “technical details” and “implementations rules” for applying the new 
system from 2016 were a “shopping-list of disparate requests” that would lead to a regime “more 
restrictive than the previous one, in clear contradiction with the spirit and the letter of the reform”. 
The European wine associations were “shocked” by this back-door mobilization and believed that 
                                                          
60 The 1970 EEC classification (“quality wines” and “table wines”) was replaced in 2008 with another classification: 
“wines with a Geographical Indication (GI)” and “wines without a GI.” Within the first category, there are two 
subcategories: Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) wines and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) wines, with 
PDO as the highest quality level (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013).  
 
61 The decision was a compromise between the European Parliament that wanted a longer scheme (until 2030) but a 
lower limit for large vineyards (0.5%) and the Council of Ministers that wished for a higher maximum yearly increase 
(2%) but a different end-date (2024 and not 2030) (AGRA FACTS, 2013). However, French winegrowers already 
asked in June 2015 more than 8,000 hectares of new authorizations, above the 1% threshold. As a result, European 
wine associations are already thinking of increasing the percentage during a possible “mid-term review” of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2017.   
62 This occurred during the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) negotiations (through the so-called delegated 
and implementing acts). 
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these requests were only justified on the grounds of protecting “a bunch of privileges driven by 
domestic narrow interests”.  
The final rules (delegated and implementing regulations) are now published (Regulation 
No. 2015/560; Regulation No. 2015/561). However, the political debate will continue at the 
national level, as the implementation rules can be changed. It is therefore still not fully clear how 
the new vine planting system will be implemented by the member states in the coming years.  
Every year three type of decisions can be made. First, member states will be able to 
establish a lower threshold (lower than 1%) at national or regional level for new plantings – the 
so-called “safeguard mechanism”.63 Even if at national level the threshold is maintained at 1%, 
regions (or even smaller areas eligible for specific PDO/PGI) could still decide to lower the 
threshold. Second, member states can decide to impose restrictions on the allocation of the 
authorizations. If requests by winegrowers for new plantings are below the 1% threshold, all 
requests will be accepted. However, if the requests exceed the 1% threshold, authorizations shall 
be granted either according to a “pro-rata distribution of hectares to all applicants” or according 
to “objective and non-discriminatory priority criteria” which can vary substantially.64 Third, 
restrictions can be imposed on the replanting of PDO/PGI wines through a recommendation from 
a professional organization (i.e., wine producers association) (Regulation No. 2015/560; 
Regulation No. 2015/561).65  
                                                          
63 These limitations have to be justified either by (a) “the need to avoid a well-demonstrated risk of oversupply of wine 
products in relation to market prospects for those products, not exceeding what is necessary to satisfy this need” or 
(b) “the need to avoid a well-demonstrated risk of significant devaluation of a particular protected designation of 
origin or a protected geographical indication.” (Article 63, Regulation No. 1308/2013). 
64  There are eight priority criteria established by the European Commission, e.g., producers who are setting up vine 
plantings for the first time; areas where vineyards contribute to the preservation of the environment; areas facing 
natural or other specific constraints; projects with the potential to improve the quality of products with geographical 
indications (Article 64, Regulation No. 1308/2013; Annex II, Regulation No. 2015/560). 
65 In theory the replanting are now automatically granted (“the granting of authorizations to producers grubbing up 
an existing vine area should be automatic upon submission of an application”) (Regulation No. 1308/2013). However, 
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In summary, in the current authorization system, restrictions to control the supply of wine 
can be imposed on the total amount of land available for new plantings (1% or less), on the way 
these new plantings are allocated to winegrowers, and on the replantings of PDO/PGI wines. 
Moreover, these are yearly decisions66 determined by member states and professional 
organizations according to national and PDO/PGI priorities, thereby strengthening regional 
power.67 
To illustrate the different outcomes that are possible, consider two (extreme) scenarios.  
One scenario which could give greater flexibility to the wine sector is that of a 1% yearly expansion 
in vineyard areas, a pro-rata distribution of new plantings and no replanting restrictions on 
PDO/PGI wines. This would allow innovative wine producers to plant wines without a GI (outside 
the production rules established within the GI areas) and to plant, for instance, different varieties 
than those imposed by the PDO/PGI areas – also to adapt to climate change or different consumer 
tastes and preferences.68 However, another scenario which could also be possible is that of a 
                                                          
Member States may, under certain circumstances and in areas eligible for the production of PDO/PGI wines, restrict 
the replanting on the basis of a recommendation from a professional organization “provided that the decision is 
justified by the need to avoid a well-demonstrated risk of significant devaluation of a  specific protected designation 
of origin or protected geographical indication” (Article 4, Regulation No. 2015/560). 
66 Every year, member states have to submit nine documents to the European Commission: (a) the communication on 
wine-growing areas; (b) the notifications on the limitations on the 1% threshold; (c) whether Member States decide to 
apply the priority criteria; (d) a notification on the restrictions decided by Member States in relation to replantings; (e) 
an updated national list of professional organizations or interested groups of producers; (f) the communication on the 
total size of the areas ascertained as planted with vines without an authorization as well as the non-authorized areas 
grubbed up; (g) a notification on the applications for authorizations for new plantings requested, on the authorizations 
effectively granted and refused by the applicants during the previous year; (h) a notification on the authorizations for 
replantings granted during the previous wine year; (i) a notification on the authorizations granted during the previous 
wine year on the basis of the conversion of valid planting rights (Article 11, Regulation No. 2015/561). 
67 The power of the professional organizations will be crucial in lowering the 1% threshold, in applying replantings 
restrictions or in allocating new plantings. For instance, in 2015, only 9% of the new authorizations will produce wines 
without a GI (JORF, 2015). 
68 As mentioned earlier, in the previous “planting rights” system, replanting rights could only be used to produce wines 
with a GI. This rule severely limits experimentation as it is simply not possible to buy planting rights to start producing 
a wine outside an existing GI region. Moreover, new producers cannot produce wines which do not conform to the 
existing rules laying down how wine in the GI region should be produced. As a result, new winegrowers are forced to 
produce existing products. 
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threshold lower than 1%, a “priority” allocation of new plantings (for instance, restricting 
authorizations to vineyards located in slopes with terraces or to winegrowers that grow certain 
grape varieties) and replanting restrictions on PDO/PGI wines. This would imply that the new 
authorization system could be more restrictive than the previous one. 
IX. Why liberalization may require another French Revolution 
 
The previous section explained how –similar to the EEC decision-making on wine during 
France’s integration into the EEC in the 1970s– even a qualified majority vote in favor of planting 
rights liberalization in the 2000s ultimately was only a temporary (and non-effective) step towards 
liberalization. Opposition to the liberalization overcame even this ‘obstacle’, successfully using 
the political strategy of emphasizing member states’ “fear of oversupply” and of “significant 
devaluation of a PDO/PGI”. 
In historical perspective these arguments are very similar to the 1731 edict of King Louis 
XV which stated that the planting rights measure was driven by an “over-abundance of vines in 
the kingdom (…) to the extent that the value and reputation in many places was destroyed”. 
Another remarkable point of similarity is the discussion regarding production on hill slopes versus 
production in the plains.69 The final document of the High Level Group on Wine Planting Rights 
(2012, p.16) states that: “there is a risk that production would move from that kind of fragile areas 
[areas in slopes] to lower cost production areas in the plains where higher yields could be 
obtained.” The similarity to the 1725 edict is remarkable as it protected the vineyards on the slopes 
                                                          
69 Interestingly, the Romans were also aware of the “hills versus plains” production. Vergil, in his Georgics (first 
century B.C.), states that: “apertos/Bacchus amat colles” (“Bacchus loves open hills”) (Book II, lines 112–113). 
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by forbidding vine plantings in the “uncultivated part, commonly called the swamps or the 'moors 
of Bordeaux'”, the vast flat plains south of Bordeaux.70  
In summary, one can only conclude that the political forces against liberalization of 
planting rights are very strong. Old and recent history suggests that planting rights liberalization 
is possible but only under exceptional political and economic conditions. Major economic events 
(the destruction caused by World War II which caused a 10 year break in the planting rights 
restrictions in 1942–1952 and the dramatic fall in Algerian wine imports which contributed to a 
relaxation in 1964–1970), major institutional changes (France’s integration in the EEC which 
resulted in a temporary compromise in 1970–1975) or political decisions (an EU qualified majority 
vote in favor of liberalization which was turnover before it could be implemented) only caused 
short periods of liberalization and proved not strong enough to effectively overcome the strong 
opposition in the long run.  
Only the French Revolution led to a fundamental liberalization of planting rights at the end 
of the 18th century (after being in place for almost 70 years). The “liberal period” of the 19th century 
was sustained by the combination of the French Revolution’s liberal ideology, the thirst for wine 
of Napoleon’s armies and diseases that wiped out most of the French vineyards. Even for those in 
favor of the liberalization, these condition must be a frightening prospect. 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Translation by the authors. “(…) partie non cultivée, vulgairement appelée landes ou Bruyères de Bordeaux.” 
(Montesquieu, 1726, p. 267). 
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X. Epilogue 
 
“But I believe that my old castle and my vats will soon call me to the country; for since 
the peace71 my wine becomes more and more in vogue amongst the English, much more so than 
even my book.” 
Letter of Montesquieu to the Grand Prior Solar, 1749 
 
“The Code is more like ‘guidelines’ rather than actual rules.” 
Captain Hector Barbossa72  
 
Montesquieu, differently from other writers and philosophers that depended on the 
generosity of wealthy patrons, maintained his financial independence thanks to the profits he made 
out of wine trade (Brut-Moncassin, 2006, p.191; Lacouture, 2003, p.10).73 At the time of the 1725 
edict, Montesquieu already owned 216 hectares of vines in the Bordeaux wine region: 11 hectares 
of vines in La Brède,74 75 hectares of vines in Rochemorin (Martillac), 60 hectares of vines in 
Raymond, 70 hectares of vines in Montesquieu (where he produced Armagnac), and a few vines 
in Clairac (Brut-Moncassin, 2006, p.208).75 
Since his wine constituted the wealth of his estate, Montesquieu wanted to plant more 
vineyards. Despite the 1725 regulation, in 1726 he acquired lands (about 10 hectares) in Pessac in 
                                                          
71 The war of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) followed a period of peace in Europe.  
72 Quote from the “Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl”, 2003 British-American film directed by 
Gore Verbinski. 
73  “I have not wanted to make my fortune by means of the Court; my design has been to make it by improving my 
lands” [Translation by the authors. “Je n'ai pas aimé à faire ma fortune par le moyen de la cour; j'ai songé à la faire en 
faisant valoir mes terres”] (Montesquieu, 1720/1835, p.621).  
74 Franck, (1845, p.143) states that: “In the municipalities of La Brède (…) vineyards give only ordinary wine” 
[Translation by the authors. “Dans les communes de La Brède (…) les vignobles ne donnent que des vins ordinaires”]. 
75 Montesquieu expanded invested in land throughout his entire life. It was said that: “There is no house, field, 
vineyard, tuft of grass in that area that does not belong to Mr. de Montesquieu” [Translation by the authors. “Il n’est 
pas une demeure, un champ, une vigne, une touffe d’herbe dans cette région qui n’appartienne pas à Monsieur de 
Montesquieu”] (Brut-Moncassin, 2006, p.209). 
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the district of Pujeaux-de-Péougran (6 km south from Bordeaux) because of the higher expected 
value of the wines (Martin, 1907, p.6; Perceval, 1935, p.30). It was close to one of the most well-
known and wealthy wine producers –Château Haut-Brion. Montesquieu acquired the lands in 
Pessac for an amount of 60 livres (currency of France until 1795). As he wrote, his intention was 
to transform it into a land that would be worth 500,000 livres, thereby increasing its value by 
around 8,000 times (Montesquieu, 1726, p.271). A huge expected gain, provided the land was 
planted with vines. However, with the 1725 prohibition he could not plant vines on the new 
acquired lands.  
Faced with these (costly) restrictions he first sent a letter to his friend, M. Lamoignon de 
Courson, the previous intendant of Guyenne (1709–1720), Counsellor of State and brother-in-law 
of Mr. Le Pelletier, the just-appointed French Controlleur Général. Montesquieu explained the 
issue to him and tasked for “a permission to plant vines” (Brut-Moncassin, 2006, p.226). 
Montesquieu then wrote his essay to Mr. Le Pelletier, the just-appointed French Controlleur 
Général, arguing the need to remove the restrictions on economic ground. When his arguments 
did not lead to a change in policy, Montesquieu changed tactics. Besides being a political 
philosopher, writer of economic ideas and wine producer, he was also a wealthy and influential 
noble, involved in the highest juridical organizations in France. At the time, he was président à 
mortier (magistrate) in the “parlement” (regional court) of Bordeaux (inherited from his uncle 
Jean-Baptiste de Secondat). These appeal courts were politically influential and only nobles could 
purchase or inherit these posts (Dast Le Vacher de Boisville, 1896; Richter, 1977). 
While it remains unclear how (“on se sait comment”), Montesquieu ultimately obtained the 
permission to plant his vines. In fact, Mr. Boucher, the intendant of Guyenne, reported himself 
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that “the prohibitions were overridden on all sides, and Montesquieu himself planted his 
vineyard”.76  
Based on these plantings, Montesquieu became a successful wine producer and merchant,77 
with his wines exported to England (Lacouture, 2003). In many of Montesquieu’s letters, reference 
is made to the ‘purity’ of his wine,78 to the exports to England (his main market)79 and its increased 
reputation.80 His wine was found “extrêmement bon” –extremely good (Vian, 1879, p.161).  
The wine trade, and his success in overcoming the planting rights restrictions, allowed him 
to travel and to spend time thinking, discussing and ultimately writing up his ideas which 
influenced much of the Western world. In 1726, he sold his magistrate office and he leased his 
wine properties in order to have a comfortable rent. He then spent over a year in Paris before 
travelling to Europe, mainly to England (Richter, 1977, p.14; Walckenaër, 1835, p.xi). After 
Montesquieu visited many European countries, he returned to France in 1732 and retired to his 
Castle at La Brède that he considered to be “the most beautiful country retreat that I know of 
anywhere” (Montesquieu, 1777). After two years he published the book “Considérations sur les 
causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence” (Considerations on the Causes of the 
                                                          
76 Translation by the authors. “De fait, on passait outre aux interdictions, de toutes parts, et Montesquieu lui-même 
planta sa vigne” (Montesquieu, 1726, p.264). 
77 Montesquieu never used merchants as intermediaries; he cultivated his commercial relationships with the influential 
high society in England (as Lord Elibank) and in France (as the president of the Parlement of Paris, Mr. Marie-Jean 
Hérault de Séchelles), believing that “I have always had the principle of never having another do what I could do by 
myself” [Translation by the auhors. “J'ai eu pour principe de ne jamais faire par autrui ce que je pouvais par moi-
même”] (Montesquieu, 1720/1835, p.620). 
78 “I have sent the pipe of wine to Lord Elibank (…). Pray let him know, that he may keep it as long as he pleases (…) 
but it must not be mixed with any other wines. He may be assured that he has it in the same state of purity in which I 
received it from the deity. It has not passed through the adulterating hands of wine-merchants.” Letter to Abbé de 
Guasco, June 27, 1752 (In: Montesquieu, 1777). 
79  “You must know, my dear Abbé, that I have received very large commissions from England, for the wine of this 
year (…).” Letter to Abbé de Guasco, June 27, 1752 (In: Montesquieu, 1777). 
80 “It is to my friends, but especially to you, who are at any time worth ten others, that I owe the spreading reputation 
which my wine has acquired through Europe for these three or four years past.” Letter to Abbé de Guasco, November 
3, 1754 (In: Montesquieu, 1777). 
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Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans) and, after 16 years, in 1748, he published his famous 
“De l'Esprit des Lois” (Walckenaër, 1835, p.xiii-xiv).  
Hence, ultimately for Montesquieu, political philosophy, excellent wine and (imperfect 
enforcement of) planting rights reinforced each other. Montesquieu was so successful in the wine 
trade that he claimed that his wine was more popular in England than his book (“De l'Esprit des 
Lois”): “my wine becomes more and more in vogue amongst the English, much more so than even 
my book.” 81 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
81 Nowadays, many of his estates became highly-prized and renowned wines. The Castle at La Brède is nowadays 
owned by Dominique Haverlan and produces wine sold as AOC Graves under Montesquieu’s quote “I am busy here 
producing nectar” [Translation by the authors: “Je suis occupé ici à faire du nectar”]. Another Montesquieu’s 
vineyard, the Castle Rochemorin, the dependency of the Castle at La Brède, is owned by André Lurton and sold as 
Pessac-Léognan appellation wines (Coates, 2004; Parker, 2013). 
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Table 1 
Chronology of Plantings Restrictions in France and the EU, 1725–2030 
 
Time Decision-making institutions Decision/proposal 
1725 King Louis XV - Prohibition to plant vines in the Bordeaux 
wine region 
1731 King Louis XV - Prohibition to plant vines was extended to 
the entire French kingdom 
1789 National Constituent Assembly  - Abolished privileges and the feudal regime 
“Freedom of planting”  
1931–35 French government - The Statut Viticole introduced planting 
rights regime 
WWII French government  
(“Vichy regime”) 
- The Statut Viticole was suspended 
“Freedom of planting” 
1953 French government - Code du Vin (re-)introduced planting rights 
regime 
1964 French government - The 1964 law eased rules on market 
intervention and on planting rights 
1970 European Economic Community 
(EEC) 
- Regulations introduced restrictions on the 
replanting of vines for EEC  
1976 European Economic Community 
(EEC) 
- Complete ban on all new plantings for table 
wines 
1984 European Economic Community 
(EEC) 
- Regulations introduced restrictions on 
planting rights for “high quality” wines 
2006 European Union (EU) - The European Commission proposes to 
liberalize the planting rights regime 
2008 European Union (EU) - EU Ministers of Agriculture adopted the 
EU Commission’s proposal to liberalize the 
planting rights by 2016/2018 
2013 European Union (EU) - The earlier agreed liberalization of the 
planting right system was overturned 
- Decision to extend the planting restrictions 
until 2030 
2016 European Union (EU) - A new program of “authorizations” for new 
plantings starting in 2016 and ending in 
2030 
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Table 2 
Plantings Restrictions in France and in Italy, 1950s–1970s 
 
Time        France               Italy 
 High quality Low quality High quality Low quality 
1953 Yes1 Yes No No 
 - AOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
- New plantings 
allowed (only for 
rec. var.)2 
- New plantings  
not allowed 
 
- Replanting 
allowed for rec. 
(100%) and auth. 
(70%) var. 
  
1964 Yes Yes Yes No 
 - AOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
 
- New plantings 
allowed (only for 
rec. var.) 
- New plantings 
allowed (only for 
rec. var.) 
 
- Replanting 
allowed for rec. 
(100%) and auth. 
(70%) var.3 
 1963: DOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
19704 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 - AOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
 
- New plantings 
allowed (only for 
rec. var.) 
- New plantings 
allowed (for rec. 
& auth. var.) 
 
- Replanting 
allowed for rec. 
(100%) and auth. 
(70%) var. 
- DOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
 
- New plantings 
allowed (for rec.& 
auth. var.) 
- New plantings 
allowed (for rec. 
& auth. var.)  
 
- Replanting 
allowed (for 
rec.&auth. var.)5 
1976 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 - AOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
- New plantings 
allowed (only for 
rec. var.) 
- New plantings  
not allowed 
 
- Replanting 
allowed for rec. 
(100%) and auth. 
(70%) var. 
- DOC rules 
(specific varieties) 
 
- New plantings 
allowed (for rec.& 
auth. var.) 
- New plantings  
not allowed 
 
- Replanting 
allowed (for 
rec.&auth.var.) 
Notes:  
1 Yes/No refers to whether there are planting restrictions. 
2 “rec. var.” stands for “recommended varieties” and “rec.& auth. var.” for “recommended and authorized varieties”. 
3 Restrictions on replanting rights were included in the French Rural Code (see Article R665-16). 
4 From 1970, the Common Wine Policy applied to both countries but more restrictive national regulations could be 
introduced.  
5 “Allowed” means replanting rights for 100%, unless explicitly indicated. 
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Table 3 
Planting Rights and Authorizations, a Comparison 
 
 Planting Rights Authorizations 
Time Frame Until December 31, 2015 From January 1, 2016 to December 
31, 2030 
Vineyard expansion No growth possible Growth possible: annual maximum 
percentage of growth corresponding 
to 1% of the member states total area 
planted with vines 
Mode of delivery Issued on the basis of 
national and regional 
priorities 
 
- Issued automatically if the 
number of available 
authorizations is higher than the 
total demand. 
- Otherwise, issued proportionally 
or through a priority criteria 
Period of validity 8 years for replanting rights; 
2 years for rights issued from 
reserves 
3 years 
Acquisition Not freely granted Freely granted 
Tradability of the 
rights 
Possible Impossible  
Wine segments PDO and PGI wines PDO, PGI and wines without a GI 
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AOC 
rules 
 
“Recommended”  
grape varieties 
 
(100% of replanting) 
“Authorized” grape varieties 
 
(70% of replanting allowed) 
 “Temporarily tolerated” grape varieties 
 
(Replanting not allowed) 
“High quality” 
wines 
 
“Low quality” 
wines  
 
 
New plantings 
allowed 
 
New plantings 
abolished  
 
Figure 1 
The French 1953 Classification of Vine Varieties and the “Quality” Pyramid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
